Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f1e82a672e26e16…

MALICIOUS

RTF

10.6 KB
MD5: 09b4dc7085245d88d5afdaf7933a2cc2 SHA-1: c4baffe8ce0c95e6301eb48fc725e824d16ad7b9 SHA-256: 2f1e82a672e26e16bc0f359146a07652b3a7badd54ada04079485f207102bcc2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor to achieve remote code execution, which is a common initial access vector for malware delivery.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001345.bin
db9bae44e95b2e89f6c83481eaa89f182671f87378343fa513bbf5e8090194db
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1345 2114 bytes