Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f082d10916fa7bc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

572.0 KB First seen: 2022-12-12
MD5: bd0c9e4b228210cb5fec4644031c8c9e SHA-1: 4ac826b63c8c1f871d5f6eb73137c10df341d93c SHA-256: 2f082d10916fa7bc2ba0b4db67ce2f1fc4985f37ba321100d09f8415f8aeb3e3
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' indicates a sophisticated loader mechanism. The presence of 'Shell()' and 'CreateObject()' calls within the Workbook_Open event strongly suggests the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely downloading and running a secondary payload from the embedded URL. The obfuscated nature of the VBA code points towards an attempt to evade detection.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.motobit.com/help/scptutl/sa298.htm
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/dc106e26-e5a0-4ca4-b4b1-a77a5c0d832a/creating-utf8-file-in-excel-macro?forum=isvvba�
    • https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/dc106e26-e5a0-4ca4-b4b1-a77a5c0d832a/creating-utf8-file-in-excel-macro?forum=isvvba

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
aff8486280347220f641e92c440ed241a89d389b0af96a9fcdc6bbecd084f615		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 625243 bytes

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