Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 2eff70f5d03e1c43

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

487.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-02

MD5: 47a6c467f51f09a24dd2cbeead7218da SHA-1: b3c02f02e767ef629c55e1a1f81b9995f9ad149c SHA-256: 2eff70f5d03e1c43ea2c0d15d23a1a020bb5d0975e4b6656afc6b992033d4367

132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates that the OLE object is configured to load a remote resource from the URL 'https://m-ini.me/pmR8'. This exploit is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of embedded PDF objects and VBA macros further suggests a multi-stage attack, though the VBA code itself appears benign.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL https://m-ini.me/pmR8

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`stream_003_off00007760.bin` `2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7760	252488 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf` `3e9542ccfafe1b03210be1226210965e583702cbb4c2f2228a3cf51646ecc903`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00	495104 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00007c00.pdf` `aabc255daabf74d9aa556ea056ced42ea636831bce455379b3988ef22fe4bbad`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x7C00	466944 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off0002aa00.pdf` `b327dbf72a0070fbcb3b3121952c51707861a5a427b555dd84875bd93fe4f560`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2AA00	324096 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.