Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2eff1c754438942c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

190.5 KB Created: 2018-03-21 11:47:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: 24f66f9f52f5b1968f6f2cec5fbef592 SHA-1: 751b0949580e0aa5000f768617d27f38a4d702d8 SHA-256: 2eff1c754438942c64dcdcb2d9276b370449a48863098dfb9b381323908e95a4
402 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document that exploits CVE-2007-3899, a memory corruption vulnerability. It contains an embedded OLE package that likely drops a PIF file, which is an auto-executable payload. The presence of VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress API calls, along with XOR-encoded strings, indicates the execution of a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Win.Trojan.Agent-7657278-0' further confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 10

  • CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899
    Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is related Office object-delivery evidence when paired with exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed graphics record required for exact CVE attribution is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-7657278-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Agent-7657278-0
  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0xDA) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 3 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0xDA: 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'VirtualAlloc'
    Disassembly hidden — these bytes score as data, not coherent x86 code (no internal branches to corroborate control flow).
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://secure.comodo.net/CPS0C In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ocsp.comodoca.com0In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODORSACodeSigningCA.crl0tIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://crt.comodoca.com/COMODORSACodeSigningCA.crt0$In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1591621150/Ole10Native 71396 bytes
SHA-256: 3f1a6b1f3cf8a0c1212fd48e6bc26df84db197e327898c7b04746bc2e6ce5eab
ole10native_00_5C.pif ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: ObjectPool/_1591621150/Ole10Native; display_name=5C.pif; full_path=C:\Users\win7home\AppData\Local\Temp\5C.pif; temp_path=; def_file= 71120 bytes
SHA-256: aa57258f768a786edb9918b99ba6718fc5464b56ac26911482026e7f072ace16

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