Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2eda5d52ebc1aaac…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.16 MB
MD5: 6c6343eac8199ff73a0e879bb075a2c4 SHA-1: 65f7bfd1736f54f9a466b014511166c8bd16ebda SHA-256: 2eda5d52ebc1aaaca90e7020ff68456136e7517e2d13486428c77cfae918d48f
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document is encrypted with a default password and contains an embedded OLE object identified as Equation Editor. This is a common technique for delivering exploits. The presence of the Equation Editor OLE object strongly suggests an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities within that component to execute arbitrary code.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.