Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ec9acad3b62e878…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

240.7 KB Created: 2021-03-30 14:26:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000
MD5: 1d26f52d9e82e1ee81bffa05cb2f15f8 SHA-1: 357c80c59d0c1da34146911151cbe33f8fd94035 SHA-256: 2ec9acad3b62e878363373e00d4b5e2d7db85644596ba8c197610cf548cf96c4
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a macro-enabled Word document (DOCM) that contains an AutoOpen macro, indicating it attempts to execute malicious code upon opening. The document body impersonates a confidentiality agreement from Sberbank, likely as a lure. The presence of CreateObject calls and extracted VBA macros suggests the script attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload from the provided URLs.

Heuristics 6

  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • External hyperlinks (1) low OOXML_EXTERNAL_HYPERLINKS
    Document contains 1 external hyperlink — clickable URLs are stored as external relationships. First target: http://www.sberbank.ru/
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.sberbank.ru/
    • https://usamyforever.azureedge.net/fmnfieikfemsdfdssdf/fjafisisafeg54/excel.txt
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0eea14cba29894f2b2e6fe219500d9712749d65fd966d54233e5db7dd622d309		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3127 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
9c6e0984403cf3543d04850f2557619aec3eca81a77f8af31d41a162b8c584af		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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