Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ec5f370ea41d376…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

78.8 KB Created: 2021-03-26 06:47:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 63e3a9a58795b005370b06691dbf13b4 SHA-1: e82d74a967c95ca9c70b79ba7395e723e2d8cb0f SHA-256: 2ec5f370ea41d376a5cda896b9f13637d9c210644d47b82fa281d6f5f436be76
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically triggering an AutoOpen macro. The VBA code utilizes Shell() and WScript.Shell to execute commands, strongly indicating it's designed to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of these critical heuristics leads to a high confidence assessment despite the lack of specific family attribution.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
54088811b7cd519eb27790161fd30c2e9fea0abbcd691d0e1225ec677707121f
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7872 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
0d8dda255ec4d1cba68c568ce1246f8280ce40d47a8f21eb5634eddda8654f51
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36352 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.