Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2ebe22d3f2fddd0a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

308.0 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: d573534ada8cac2165e6d20ba0e20245 SHA-1: 627f3927f39c0d5cb68bdd8833e38e8842051b53 SHA-256: 2ebe22d3f2fddd0ab6c2d7c22c62c3ed52824586501d5b6f3daabdd627d9a3dc
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PowerPoint file containing a large VBA macro. Critical heuristics indicate the presence of a Shell() call within the Auto_Close macro, which is configured to execute automatically. This suggests the macro is designed to run a command upon closing the presentation. No specific malware family is identifiable from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/wasajsidjasdasdkokokmkoocs

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
637c05b598d5243fa3f3300430d9fedaa83778fecf0eaddbca91adf3c061c70e
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 82118 bytes