Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e81a792e3a548b4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

113.6 KB First seen: 2023-10-23
MD5: fa5a65a6860ec9a4b3e8037085db1789 SHA-1: 13b05d69fe79c7a7e0d6f96036abb5df69954bc1 SHA-256: 2e81a792e3a548b421c04e70684881888c7c97fa1ef74dfc5d297b4f46e24517
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) via an embedded OLE object. The document body contains a lure related to financial auditing, instructing the user to 'Enable editing' and likely macros. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics confirms the exploitation of OLE object functionality.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002dbc.bin
390a2bdc018045460f09d3556072a18ec7f6b1b14a5fe963fefcc9a9ddbe6dce
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2DBC 1551 bytes