Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e642098c27580f3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.7 KB Created: 2021-07-21 07:02:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: fba2073b77bddb5960e35f9457d1c8a7 SHA-1: b1ee6490880cd0b0a252b44096bd8e0640392a10 SHA-256: 2e642098c27580f3331010043c0dda085ce77dedcac99f51212f6be2174e86e9
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains an embedded script and multiple URLs, many of which point to compromised CMS uploads. The 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to copy/paste commands into a shell, likely to execute a PowerShell payload. The embedded script metadata mentions 'Powershell enumerate files', further supporting this attack vector. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://iaestedresden.de/userfiles/file/kozegadabami.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://zahradysnapady.cz/soubory/files/neroxizenepafatunerulewan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://phase1acoustics.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609cf5694a736---nidawatujukused.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://middlegeorgiacoinclub.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078e64f26828---melosapozepufijesubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pokorny-podlahy.cz/UserFiles/File/mafaxepubesavarivizum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://robertmatzuzi-massagetherapist.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a217f6c77ca---72498390687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://meble-tk.pl/userfiles/file/xixeminosadojerugad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.timtransportes.com/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8c707eadea---20808451880.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ivepe-elearning.gr/assets/UserFiles/mainHome/file/15883305446.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://doggystylzgrooming.com/admin/photos/file/fojolufepininivo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://joepromenshealth.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/652a1ec8876f20e5600814c64f00a048/kabusejotuxurexe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nhaban24h.com.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/n3bq16punnjn81kv1brv232fnb/61581562179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://robinio.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l928ineg6jgbsjt7810p8c24di/92979620886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://interno-kazan.ru/upload/files/rolodubajoduw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stomatoloska-ordinacija-rijeka.com/files/dikuzeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://diedacorporation.net/freesiafiles/file/suxofupesuputitutoti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yomamasushitogo.com/uploads/files/tetifokezisuliko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cuatro-pr.org/sites/default/files/file/majovusuxapuzomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kbstephens.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c64ad244432d32f229810370119ecc08/16094949793.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://principesgs.com/userfiles/file/bisugimewazisemozokijebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.asejnrtigers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085105c0c584---vogito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://realimpacto.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089bb7f77055---tekajerase.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://euroroma-bg.org/files/file/86422948478.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+enumerate+filesPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00016561.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x16561 1581 bytes
SHA-256: 2aae10962afec70bdca46a9ea78ef09f3840621b0d2c1ed37ff9a06b722eaf3a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='pdf-parser'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Weniwaya Lokojuzu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell enumerate files.   The Get-ChildItem cmdlet supports wildcarding through three parameters: Path The -Path parameter i</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell enumerate files.   The Get-ChildItem cmdlet supports wildcarding through three parameters: Path The -Path parameter i</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell enumerate files</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='pdf-parser'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-04T17:24:52'
  xmp:CreatorTool='pdf-parser'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='20963dcb-843a-40d9-a614-a4cb3f0033a0'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='c601f20a-c3a6-461b-a7c8-c712dc846e6d'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000fbd2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFBD2 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off000113e4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x113E4 18552 bytes
SHA-256: 3cb1b8ac82e4c9ead1bdc6e9ec3a66cb833e89a62f224f86013bfff5f0ecb1f5
font_02_sfnt_off0001453d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1453D 10664 bytes
SHA-256: 537e8009be223ca569c99997f79d70a8fcb1808a4f90a14aab755c90a1815b78

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