Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e52e83de106026b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.6 KB Created: 2020-08-31 22:44:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a69df09b08fe641d00cc9020c137cddf SHA-1: 5c24eb29f0ec428f541841f0d44b45a37f3d8ad1 SHA-256: 2e52e83de106026b8633dd1d0ccc62cbf7ccd528f51c07feed1150a90405cb1d
168 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains heuristics indicating it's a malicious redirector and part of an advance-fee scam lure. It embeds numerous links, with one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL. The primary attack pattern involves social engineering to trick the user into clicking the malicious link.

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Advance-fee lottery/parcel scam lure high SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE
    Document contains lottery/beneficiary or prize language together with large-value draft/funds wording and parcel/courier delivery requirements. This is a classic advance-fee fraud document shape.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=binary+system+pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/5725/9420/files/free_kindergarten_worksheets_color_by_number.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1713/4499/files/proform_hybrid_exercise_bike_and_cross_trainer.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7318/3637/files/rexitig.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5101/6601/files/android_payment_gateway_api.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0447/9080/8727/files/alternative_fuel_vehicles.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/9798/1082/files/10587953943.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b3bc21_38645a95f4c34b7f9912f9d3514c704b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_fe8aeb1f89ed49f4afa2aec51ad6f582.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9904c2_d2023e19186440418b242edc2f2e79de.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a31856_f65838e610a3496eb505ee4feea926f5.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6404/9318/files/33507580154.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9729/1942/files/pajivinawemaw.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007403.bin
301e06d09a2ddf664c7c55fa8532dc8036c4c3b40a123a36ac3505d308d56155		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7403 5308 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008605.bin
7c545be78076a993975c95fd57f7e892a256fb89cfb20c4bf3665244b4121873		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8605 10400 bytes

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