PDF malware analysis — malicious · 2e2aefee1f0a81ad

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.7 KB

MD5: bc02e1838f878a71f7d18884e30b50c0 SHA-1: f03376a442dc8e3e50885c4bc75e96c231cf412f SHA-256: 2e2aefee1f0a81adbd197f3b4d46988f271b4c831aef81d01ee330cfd9493db6

136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The sample is a PDF document that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. The exploit targets a LibTIFF vulnerability within the XFA processing. This indicates the document is designed to deliver a malicious payload upon opening in a vulnerable version of Adobe Reader. No scripts were directly extracted, but the exploit itself is the primary attack vector.

Heuristics 6

Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188

PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT

PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `253dd7d227a1e24dbdda979515105c83db2481de5bcb0cd101c669123083b36e`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6	101367 bytes

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