Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e2295c29610c858…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 484be17f86d5f3fe19117cde512b7835 SHA-1: b98db5bf4e847095c044a23d66434710bb9d7b58 SHA-256: 2e2295c29610c858b6ef4d775420fc9af1b1e8ef82da746fdc9ba23a14ecd494
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities and automatic OLE activation. This strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution, likely delivered via a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a5.bin
cd0c502e56a707cee72bbfdcbb80381463143aeb47369b739737e33ed1f133c9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA5 1625 bytes