Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e1aca8c86562cc5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

39.1 KB Created: 2022-09-21 08:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-11-20
MD5: 1b690440b54c2a830958fe54ad34e3c7 SHA-1: c29e9215dc22ba1ef5723eca29599e8d10c67c17 SHA-256: 2e1aca8c86562cc52b8bee6ecc45dabb1c11ebba94c81b059d8859a1b263f1e7
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a Document_Open macro. This macro is obfuscated but reconstructs to a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a second-stage payload from a URL. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0' further confirms its malicious nature as a downloader.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8be43cc902b539bbbdfaaab9bf9529da14a29fa8937057ab3b99dbd5c0dcabf1		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8851 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
22ac19f8a24f5cd89f9a9057c401303ebca27ca5f33eb341510971d15961bf74		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 57344 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Valyria-10029951-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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