Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2e059934c1f6786f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.43 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-24
MD5: 383d883be15a9b3f35ce3efe475bef39 SHA-1: 0052a54d7b51e281b7aa61ab32621d05cb922166 SHA-256: 2e059934c1f6786fa0108c8cad6e7a7aff078f99c2787aa1d2cfc16ff691d45d
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample contains an OLE object exploiting CVE-2017-11882, which is a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This object embeds a PDF file that contains a direct link to a payload. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting they are not the primary execution vector. The embedded PDF's suspicious static findings and direct payload link indicate a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
e93a82edfbdb9c1b544b5bb6bd27635d7cdd782afdf87f72f6eadbc6d6b8f04c		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD001081BC/Ole10NaTiVE 1304 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00007f7d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F7D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009d95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9D95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
0b4446a522efca94b157a11152f5d55a60266d60e7680afdc70ff0395de1dab8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1496064 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
7dd464a7dc1b3ad25da4cdc7ebd502ac5179761fb8dc53d496b191eeff2d12e7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1475584 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf
3b922348a13a225bac8595d141e8639b256e45d6b623412fb23e2e3028cff852		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 1441792 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00023e00.pdf
ab8b69bc6bcf4c9f2b171db439f57679c7548fa2f3f6531d5d1aa4296c16d58c		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x23E00 1353728 bytes

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