Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2de478e12ef3f929…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.9 KB Created: 2021-06-10 21:33:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 2377d42b345053fe86e184d0704fc7c4 SHA-1: 3afead9b56d419097ed49dbfc09103b392531355 SHA-256: 2de478e12ef3f92906c9f3196ab907a12e70a64230b92f04ed36d222969f5be4
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document employs social engineering tactics, specifically a browser extension/update installation lure and a visual download button, to trick the user into executing malicious content. The presence of numerous links to compromised WordPress sites and external URLs suggests a phishing or malware distribution campaign. ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ketchas.ru/uplcv?utm_term=bkash+app+uptodown PDF link annotation
    • https://marciasmithconsulting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/05207d6091904fea72c941d6c9a5948d/43352325799.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://softwarefactory.nl/images/file/povagekojizewuledomogu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://elicopter-de-inchiriat.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607418441bb71---55431685110.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://autoradiator.mn/uploads/ckfinder/files/megifisikitu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://omniatel.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607629189ba9e---52045078594.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dossalas.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/59a5abff4209019936d1537809aef7b2/puzasipinujubapiretez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aksaaydinlatma.com/img/editor/image/file/juzotigekitufizugakok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://primeodontorj.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9f91b0538cf83827904ec26778e4cc66/mubiforik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://parklanehotel.asia/userfiles/file/86699200586.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aimara-bg.com/userfiles/file/najugujaxozafojaxevagab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qboardapp.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9892c32c65feba46606536550d68621a/bojubagora.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.autodepotperformancegroup.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7r5v2869k0retbmmcbp8e9rkd9/safujekugabuxagebavi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://misionesmedellin2030.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ki1mu256k6gn17p2f1l1suiecm/deradoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.corridar.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4ahgcqch1qvflt4a5ebcqamko7/peseriduvigagoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://starkhigh1972.com/clients/d/dd/dd83d6d7846a033806cdb512e10d7d7c/File/jisekisup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010860.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10860 5124 bytes
SHA-256: 409700537ebb1aa0206ee9f668fd1963da53d4364d852514ae1cc306d4b57609
font_01_sfnt_off000119e0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x119E0 10932 bytes
SHA-256: b5191f4edb01866cc7b9c970fb66ff6a6171b9a6a1380b1843c6fcaf004547c1