Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2dcbbbf553af1a59…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

310.1 KB
MD5: 0c31358e977769af5e167e6828b8565a SHA-1: 948856ff58dbcb77e4ad77f6b9546152073ee679 SHA-256: 2dcbbbf553af1a59ac1beb124df4aeaa7e3dd821db642129c2b6bcab3d38a82f
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

This XLSX file is password-encrypted and contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, which is a known exploit carrier. The presence of the 'OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR' and 'CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY' heuristics strongly indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The 'OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED' heuristic further suggests the file is designed to evade detection and deliver a malicious payload, likely through the embedded object.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.