Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2dc19e323f4990ba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.3 KB Created: 2021-06-24 07:52:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: 6c4e76cc10be8add4e92c77a6006eb87 SHA-1: bf43d9f75df6c386eaca3f6664b26f3a4e2ea2c1 SHA-256: 2dc19e323f4990ba258dceca0434a52571f260037d803c5806b890e3a26e3631
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The document contains numerous URLs pointing to compromised websites and disposable hosting, suggesting it functions as a link farm to distribute further malicious content. The presence of 'cmd0isidq9t8ukbrf4/vurusutakofofomug.pdf' in the document text hints at the potential execution of commands or exploitation of vulnerabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://drafthe.ru/uplcv?utm_term=grade+12+trigonometry+questions+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://propbrains.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rftgdleocmd0isidq9t8ukbrf4/vurusutakofofomug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://apinero.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072c11c5ed95---57104026977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brandnewgoods.net/userfiles/file/43754302004.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://driver-jazda.pl/upload/file/wafapizorofuxokunegu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.saenger-ohg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f8d9fc34dc---kevoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.charityweiss.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ba706852c4---lifowosulig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yuseigachi.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2c5b258702---fejofukefulekedifa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bazatalty.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/02f7dcd93a78ddeb03bca8624af8e5c7/fenawura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://qualitylightsolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aef4996c3733e4f49cf97f996e9da684/12973071861.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shining4u.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8430fac4a6b546513321684f35c2e7d2/37585155432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://traonguoc.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a95eorsju3lnqpp8m9j5jrks4s/volumibopewotupenijijami.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.everhouse.lt/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609287f759f04---60450740461.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://adm.allianceflooring.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ad9e9b60e222d75e035eaa0d7d3cb051/zafibipusuxabobelofow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://agapetown.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lilavepov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.charroninc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8798cc405190b9a959a3b78f17f19f0c/fiwipadunuxitexivesin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.truesdalepainting.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160775ff35ab5c---46132636273.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ckrestaurantgroup.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/11245533904.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://apinero.comIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cbea.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCBEA 5772 bytes
SHA-256: 4710337c42230ef2c4c485da47af18d760b2c1cf4108e9910246aaaba219b95e
font_01_sfnt_off0000df80.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF80 11508 bytes
SHA-256: 865849f49a38d4c28e580f347ae1ebc342e2658a9e2ee35d380d5773129038c1
font_02_sfnt_off000106a1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x106A1 16208 bytes
SHA-256: d48923832d37c7dd5dc06564b0328b0915ed3ced40654294f05114ab2ccf063b

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