Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2dc1471c7a73eadd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.92 MB
MD5: 3fd109ebb186743c12ac2922863d07dd SHA-1: 5d8a0cee756d18eabd4430fab3d64f8a96bf2ee9 SHA-256: 2dc1471c7a73eadd6afda4cf3aa7e424351af455207404584486d2d1747b8aed
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the presence of a payload associated with CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit is designed to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~2010KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003e.bin
a3f2003555623aa5f48af3f361d3cc73dc9eba87570436a5248613edd8ffd76a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E 1005318 bytes