Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2da497272ce0e98a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-10-30 02:31:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 5fbc5e66f3e0236835e394eb5a40f0bf SHA-1: b88f937ac939df76a7230de7a39508fce55dbefd SHA-256: 2da497272ce0e98a34a8d5f9d8edb466574bb7edee163301164677e40241f2e2
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, with one identified as a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are likely part of a link farm designed to lure users to malicious sites or for SEO manipulation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=ffxiv+monk+quest+location In PDF document text
    • https://kifisiwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266158/vamavugixonet-mapewafuxiwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xawuwotogot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695388/noxupi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://liwifaxuje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874244/7380629.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sozivutapadonen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164462/f6ffa7e1a9c6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380692/normal_5f93315116736.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goduvozimaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380582/tasiruwokivaped.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xopigitit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134339451/0d3a64e50a82.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuzofetix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371052/7821665a640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/ramugimexixepaba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4405946/normal_5f96c5eb859cb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zodebosamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444592/e2434de35.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guvapokasek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437462/zisenurevabufodesor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rimesozarabef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607712/e5d13d1eabae7dc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/acff1082-a7e4-44d2-abe3-ddf9813a679e/vakurak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/81baf824-3829-42f9-a2fc-328d24cf95be/jeepers_creepers_2_full_movie_123.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000643e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x643E 5204 bytes
SHA-256: 140ffb3b51acddb17fd91cd9d511dc818b9e48d1422a1093be1ab8e0bbc09898
font_01_sfnt_off000075fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75FE 9688 bytes
SHA-256: 3b1873130c98743bfd6c3ca46e40786cf29166c5eb16e524938b8c3ca024af89