Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d81518e22ec06db…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.3 KB
MD5: a0d200834b8e4bce46520a97dd468053 SHA-1: c6e2c6ca63e3d377b2b7347ba4e2ad071f41e162 SHA-256: 2d81518e22ec06dbc7091008d55481d35fe15b3ebc931ad6960759ab11e8d4c0
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, although no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000010da.bin
92676a5c58151ed75fca01acb7b1419210ca956c4b216b9d9bd6289a0cabe574		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10DA 1900 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.