Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d7f587a761d5fe3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.1 KB
MD5: 297f7a4d5e0a2c9420288680eba471fe SHA-1: 1242faff50a6f1c95a8f4984ac77b9beaee63c16 SHA-256: 2d7f587a761d5fe3f5c91130520733b3acb40520d44068d92247305c2f605fb9
138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The PDF file contains an XFA form that triggers the CVE-2010-0188 exploit, targeting Adobe Reader. This exploit is known to be used for delivering secondary payloads. No scripts were extracted, and the document body is not human-readable, suggesting the exploit is the primary mechanism for compromise. The embedded file is likely the malicious payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
f936ae6e7fa5bc57b4299b685154a37e4c6adb81c5779c0afacd3f2b76bba3d4
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 66910 bytes