Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d767d092ddb038f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

777.2 KB Created: 2018-04-18 01:54:00 First seen: 2018-04-30
MD5: a4096b88393dd71893804ef3d8d738c5 SHA-1: 8f60ccc9d77725c62647adca9084ae114ca97cca SHA-256: 2d767d092ddb038f7b05c03b6377db65449942e56489dd47be047a2de6229e47
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002c17.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C17 26171 bytes
SHA-256: 75699f158555fc715fea02764fe1cc3eae06b562ea59b07caf507cbf8ba1a1b7
objdata_01_off000152bd.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x152BD 26171 bytes
SHA-256: d4ff1eeeb1a1e1134bd200553cb12da0cf2724060d16d97825976ed889633b1d
objdata_02_off00027963.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x27963 26171 bytes
SHA-256: ae8b0e24d51ede672e13df3e5276dcbfe14a44c99479bf6736986fc7a59918ae
objdata_03_off0003a009.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3A009 26171 bytes
SHA-256: fccedf99e5ba8ba4f7f451f1a50593b25ed013062420f2db607623a18b5dc65f
objdata_04_off0004c6af.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4C6AF 26171 bytes
SHA-256: f341e94e20eb442f73982fedb38b12994371df85907e1e3eff55cfc87f95ed7d
objdata_05_off0005ed55.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5ED55 26171 bytes
SHA-256: 668b5b810a2c19aa85bdab1c5e69ce1fa3f4c5bcf76509e157e1369b58271f3f
objdata_06_off000713fb.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x713FB 26171 bytes
SHA-256: 1d75692e68c424e799d0c3e43de4a0b31cd38c5a747ea864d7c2970b0dfb5599
objdata_07_off00083aa1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x83AA1 26171 bytes
SHA-256: 08078545e98f8b4d2d456fce10f0170388f85f0eeb8a14560131e9c249802355
objdata_08_off00096147.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x96147 26171 bytes
SHA-256: 6cbff530a3a73c4dc7b53d7c165ed5b8b7a611392e2404673232af229ea4b77c
objdata_09_off000a87ed.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA87ED 26171 bytes
SHA-256: 157fb595379c66f95006c8f125f9d1c49ede00525945ff96ef1c5e3dd957418e