Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d73404460e11cc5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

119.0 KB Created: 2008-07-11 06:57:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: e4d810a04ec9da270209badd1d445913 SHA-1: 8fb1b6e0be9453758293fabf12d7aa647650a54a SHA-256: 2d73404460e11cc5cd45a62d70b9a78aae5ccf7f30d23574db9ee06b52487636
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The OLE file exhibits an unusually large slack space and contains appended executable-looking payload bytes, indicating it likely functions as a dropper. The file's metadata shows it was created in 2008. No VBA macros were extractable, but the appended payload is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The SHA256 hash is included as an IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 121,856 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,543 bytes — 105,313 bytes (86%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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