PDF malware analysis — malicious · 2d619a0744fb257b

MALICIOUS

PDF

17.7 KB Created: 2010-08-29 16:19:36 Authoring application: styeZek colSnap

MD5: a0bfbcb527d40df2c979b5ed28b758aa SHA-1: a7c00814c3dc7fe56738207756f8a691e965abee SHA-256: 2d619a0744fb257be7e03aa09b0949118caeb01a38a8270074968382c9fdbfd0

166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains embedded script payloads and XFA forms with risky executable scripts, strongly indicating malicious intent. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further confirm this. The embedded scripts are likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as suggested by the 'Dropped' indicator in the ClamAV detection name.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT

PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81
Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x207	84 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0009.bin` `24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x2B8	228 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0010.bin` `b5576286a12a45f09414612899c638b43c616deceb70f490fe6269de27c9b311`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x3AB	1366 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0011.bin` `c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x6D6	199 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0012.bin` `2d1d0874eed80254cfba0eaf0b130b3f20c9602988b3130735e8c957c6e420d0`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7C8	34133 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0013.bin` `e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x4242	77 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0014.bin` `92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x42E9	56 bytes

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