RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2d4338fca2036c2a

MALICIOUS

RTF

114.3 KB First seen: 2024-07-09

MD5: 8d234d694685ef558303f59db56e0056 SHA-1: c69487910ae2ed7752777906b7bf9070a5be4383 SHA-256: 2d4338fca2036c2acf76079eb68168b183661c41129514e8f2cf4e615717fd40

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The ".objdata" section and the "\objupdate" directive strongly indicate that the file is designed to trigger code execution upon opening. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary payload, leading to a full system compromise.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000013a8.bin` `ac18706075110e24b1249541345987d89a3733be6d51a6cc0902da9323eddb78`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x13A8	2147 bytes

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