RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2d3e02c3e5be7e22

MALICIOUS

RTF

91.1 KB First seen: 2023-08-17

MD5: 6a5a98708d1cc51aaa83ab05cc366e9d SHA-1: 013bca2dfc61e6eaeb3558593716f3dcc0d86d55 SHA-256: 2d3e02c3e5be7e22a14b9474298fdba2d63010fa6f8414ea779120592b71c504

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an exploit attempt to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00003834.bin` `51c8b25d890f59c7777eaf9ec9ed48fcbe8b19e6a20994b4ff87b45c79679547`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3834	1786 bytes

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