Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d2fa1eca48fc72f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: c7ffb0d9e9a673f6fbaa4f5b38ae1d36 SHA-1: a5fe99a52f12916c612342122d67e4395c366e03 SHA-256: 2d2fa1eca48fc72ff6c8f89907d08805bb1563d78a9997a2000d9145bb86bcd8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to CVE-2017-11882 through the Equation Editor. The presence of OLE objects and the ".objupdate" directive strongly suggest that the file is designed to trigger an exploit upon opening. This exploit likely leads to arbitrary code execution, a common technique for delivering further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
476bba78fd3946ace2261f06abe29031726923e480d07a3d85f068d3033de2fc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27748 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d2d5.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2D5 478713 bytes