Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2d11902f0163d96c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.23 MB
MD5: 673a38847b61702dfffe16f3ef663e6e SHA-1: e5accbce7ac7cdd8739270e9b392ac587b0dd1c7 SHA-256: 2d11902f0163d96ce589db1484c7a50ac7fb31195881b45d7135e64f6d5b8fbc
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability related to the Equation Editor. The ".objupdate" directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to execute embedded code. The decoded object data suggests the presence of a VBScript payload, likely intended to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
1bb48bf0a92b7e958fd65bbb5d004ea062581fac86b5c3e506d0bf11e3c59cd8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27103 bytes
objdata_01_off0001c97f.bin
3f280091858d9d9519b7ced6291e0013cd7c45c5838a24fbc74c6833281e0ecd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C97F 479180 bytes