RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2d01275d4111781f

MALICIOUS

RTF

27.3 KB First seen: 2023-06-21

MD5: 66ad5008cec5ce3c8dbe5fd218eb8959 SHA-1: 154cf14de811c3cb3dfe3a689446bf5e9904eecb SHA-256: 2d01275d4111781f1e707f2d6bee38cc45de5601a159391424b5fbcb883b1322

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit vector. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object is set to activate automatically upon opening the document. This exploit is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The document body itself is a lure, instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004e53.bin` `8fc20b687ee9e0e2af7e18ee2d8b6f4c1e8af5f774efcf2c6506d05397a07046`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4E53	1472 bytes

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