Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2cea67f41e7e4bc7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.20 MB
MD5: 84c78e6de4ef5f0c45f463953f7974ec SHA-1: 3018a8907c25585afb95d899d7e02414c57f87f5 SHA-256: 2cea67f41e7e4bc7a0d6a29cc9d5ad722e976f51546941abe407a0a9db61e5d9
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file identified as an exploit carrier. It contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, which is a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities. The encryption with a default password further indicates malicious intent. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploitation via the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.