Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2cea261d7fbc6183…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

251.0 KB
MD5: 05ea3a01f9d5455736951ad6099f7ad0 SHA-1: cdc94621260813761a38959cf78c9ce22775fe80 SHA-256: 2cea261d7fbc6183c4ae6d302898a157dfd90d8b485e70f23084eabf6c5c12b8
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with one specifically triggering an ".objupdate" command that forces OLE activation. This, combined with the "Please click Enable Editing to view the document." lure, strongly suggests an attempt to exploit OLE object vulnerabilities or execute embedded code upon user interaction. No scripts were extracted, and no URLs were found, limiting further analysis of the payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000b63.bin
3c3546cf61df0d42727a09490c7aa450f8d0d02ac156e7e21859d82e197ac460
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB63 32372 bytes
objdata_01_off00010950.bin
12289ea42203fe86d5d6e86e52672f752ead5709842d0443203b40a4917d5ece
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10950 12261 bytes
objdata_02_off00016960.bin
b14a178e0947279881edb10b84888bdffd182cb1bb998352c67d31d562f87d28
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x16960 2632 bytes