Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2cdbc7946d6af301…

MALICIOUS

RTF

787.5 KB Created: 2018-04-18 02:04:00 First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: a50d13a0b873ad81b58af0b003a1888e SHA-1: b1327bd22dc28658924f724764cedbf01c487aef SHA-256: 2cdbc7946d6af3011059cbe58735954ccc1d8fe8d6d10ebe01f31d2a7a4534d4
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002c14.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C14 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 56d0e15579ed859243a9f858793d105cf818efc23c8f8bb18e523f4435c81744
objdata_01_off000156c2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x156C2 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 2b39f3247735f800b677025fc619b30494c644c7d93234f5e19e53ed508690ac
objdata_02_off00028170.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x28170 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 0a0b2b4937b6ce788e2e5937cdea2cbd158c0e7afe547a45f4e2cd337c9c5dc6
objdata_03_off0003ac1e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3AC1E 26683 bytes
SHA-256: def83dec8abb57c9aa5d1ed37eea724cf7f4cc593211240c8091d66a95c4dd66
objdata_04_off0004d6cc.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4D6CC 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 0edf67c699a4cea7e30fe7dd416ee7a56f5eb9b8bc701043ce964b321888783e
objdata_05_off000601c4.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x601C4 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 37de1a8054899119788e60b79bd08ac69a06f4dbe6f7b359e72da3b46ef16210
objdata_06_off00072c72.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x72C72 26683 bytes
SHA-256: ac34f4bb9fe5aab913944127b8bfeedbe0c07946b390f2aead207a099d844fd6
objdata_07_off00085720.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85720 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 4c52af6a2f0e459a2cb4630a293492acdd9fb415abaf639286a15fecb3000126
objdata_08_off000981ce.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x981CE 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 620d6e90e9fb5fe85c322649e0c3dd508c31ee63588f08ef2c7855a49c2544f3
objdata_09_off000aac7c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAAC7C 26683 bytes
SHA-256: ff318400fee3526612ea63d8fc67728487f26a734412f86f0791ca592aacd7d4