MALICIOUS
326
Risk Score
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998
Heuristics 10
-
ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
-
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARMSmall PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
-
Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
-
Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LUREDocument tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
-
LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMANDExtracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
-
Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARMSmall PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
-
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
-
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://dugedepap.ru/award?keyword=windows+powershell+command+history+file PDF link annotation
- https://dazuzidasepod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681566/7305988.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://evakuator-uga.ru/58048087289mwt5r.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
- http://twenty-promo2020.ru/12647399539em276.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/norumuwapa/SI4ijDX/dosabitivarorasa.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://fasukawoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453618/af182e.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://fortysgjdk.fun/line_6_pod_pro_manualdtff6.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/xexanodu/ffCohc4/72526280824.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://weritesi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135314652/2131001.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://kinijanara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134585029/pijut.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://byt-upak.ru/wemaper1iv5.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn.sqhk.co/ketixudolu/9GijJG6/49696963554.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://nolizusumebixaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438071/ecf1b07d70e8f.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://wuzesitawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134733123/pegedidojadu_zajomid_xiditonupexu.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://dazuzidasepod.weeblyIn macro / runtime command snippet
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://pewizofiwerobep.rf.gd/cara_buat_survey_guna_google_form.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://wekujugom.epizy.com/whatsapp_for_android_2._3_3.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://jolavewavesuj.epizy.com/38899693837.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_pdf_script_00011921.bin |
pdf-embedded-script | PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x11921 | 1616 bytes |
SHA-256: b718541106a179bbf1afe8ab987d0d84571628384d8959433487dce2dc2ea31f |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
|
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Karbon'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=''
xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
dc:format='application/pdf'>
<dc:creator>
<rdf:Seq>
<rdf:li>Fomipuwo Gufaleyi</rdf:li>
</rdf:Seq>
</dc:creator>
<dc:description>
<rdf:Alt>
<rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell command history file. By default, Windows PowerShell (as well as a team query) only saves the history of the commands you'</rdf:li>
</rdf:Alt>
</dc:description>
<dc:subject>
<rdf:Bag>
<rdf:li>Windows powershell command history file. By default, Windows PowerShell (as well as a team query) only saves the history of the commands you'</rdf:li>
</rdf:Bag>
</dc:subject>
<dc:title>
<rdf:Alt>
<rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell command history file</rdf:li>
</rdf:Alt>
</dc:title>
</rdf:Description>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=''
xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
pdf:Producer='Karbon'/>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=''
xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
xmp:CreateDate='2020-06-04T06:55:43'
xmp:CreatorTool='Karbon'/>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=''
xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
xmpMM:DocumentID='d2856491-7625-42e4-ac26-ae30c963ff18'
xmpMM:InstanceID='dd0f053e-a500-4d9e-8ba5-3579ab78124f'/>
<rdf:Description rdf:about=''
xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
|
|||
font_00_sfnt_off0000d97b.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD97B | 5604 bytes |
SHA-256: 89c50293ffd610e7eee5a0d71d0054b7760222224fa30e188a00a9cccf7df58a |
|||
font_01_sfnt_off0000ec7c.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC7C | 10856 bytes |
SHA-256: dcc5c3bfb1fd11d94a44922fa9757df04974b874256b44e40274f93380c46851 |
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.