Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2cb1f9d2b2344bd2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.6 KB Created: 2021-02-28 23:12:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: 34a406174094dd05c71578eb262328ba SHA-1: 264c1d9c62e133a3c826014713db4da6d0ee0aa5 SHA-256: 2cb1f9d2b2344bd27c0d988875cdf9e15fc3e99b32e06de4c4a4f329b90bd507
326 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://dugedepap.ru/award?keyword=windows+powershell+command+history+file PDF link annotation
    • https://dazuzidasepod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681566/7305988.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://evakuator-uga.ru/58048087289mwt5r.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://twenty-promo2020.ru/12647399539em276.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/norumuwapa/SI4ijDX/dosabitivarorasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fasukawoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453618/af182e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fortysgjdk.fun/line_6_pod_pro_manualdtff6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xexanodu/ffCohc4/72526280824.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://weritesi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135314652/2131001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kinijanara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134585029/pijut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://byt-upak.ru/wemaper1iv5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/ketixudolu/9GijJG6/49696963554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nolizusumebixaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438071/ecf1b07d70e8f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuzesitawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134733123/pegedidojadu_zajomid_xiditonupexu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dazuzidasepod.weeblyIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://pewizofiwerobep.rf.gd/cara_buat_survey_guna_google_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wekujugom.epizy.com/whatsapp_for_android_2._3_3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jolavewavesuj.epizy.com/38899693837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00011921.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x11921 1616 bytes
SHA-256: b718541106a179bbf1afe8ab987d0d84571628384d8959433487dce2dc2ea31f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Karbon'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Fomipuwo Gufaleyi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell command history file. By default, Windows PowerShell (as well as a team query) only saves the history of the commands you&#39;</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Windows powershell command history file. By default, Windows PowerShell (as well as a team query) only saves the history of the commands you&#39;</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows powershell command history file</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Karbon'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-06-04T06:55:43'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Karbon'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='d2856491-7625-42e4-ac26-ae30c963ff18'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='dd0f053e-a500-4d9e-8ba5-3579ab78124f'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000d97b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD97B 5604 bytes
SHA-256: 89c50293ffd610e7eee5a0d71d0054b7760222224fa30e188a00a9cccf7df58a
font_01_sfnt_off0000ec7c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC7C 10856 bytes
SHA-256: dcc5c3bfb1fd11d94a44922fa9757df04974b874256b44e40274f93380c46851