Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2cabc759e6a99ed5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.7 KB
MD5: 39280abb89d8f8fbe4f8410b8d1376d0 SHA-1: d1d9a2d841fb27e050ae3887c596f92df14e8ca7 SHA-256: 2cabc759e6a99ed5d0453f5d6f2a8e77301c8cbae4ed0cef3914968c21303213
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of ".objdata" and "\objupdate" strongly suggests an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to achieve remote code execution. No specific malware family could be identified from the static analysis alone.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d8.bin
3a5cdadb0e5d5e6cdaef14f0b8aca755d17c5ebd4e24d6f8d1a1f3520f7f2c5b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD8 2090 bytes