Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c9e032d54be0855…

MALICIOUS

RTF

570.0 KB Created: 2020-03-18 05:38:00 First seen: 2020-06-01
MD5: 785fba71db7ba08c642d75ae056c6043 SHA-1: 0701cae1b9aedfe9ac857802e210376eff70b4a0 SHA-256: 2c9e032d54be085538ddd73d7e1c2cef947f5c52fe4b34b777ebb880e36a0b35
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. The presence of ` tf1 ouicompat onttbl 0 decor charset0 Symbol;{\* evtbl{\* evfrom 0}{\* evto 0}{\*\revauth \revtim 0;}} 1 charset2 Symbol;\pard\sa200\sl276\slmult1\f0\fs24\lang9 Equation Editor\par}

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003784.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3784 3346 bytes
SHA-256: cb74e44f9cf6b4be8d51ce743833214b8e7b5951751e311bd4de33f495374ba6
objdata_01_off0000cede.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCEDE 120514 bytes
SHA-256: 8e10332140bef8503867c0050d95d78a8686d55f20941c22da97bd093b4eb6c8

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.