Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c8f9b5b148f5698…

MALICIOUS

PDF

135.2 KB Created: 2020-10-10 00:14:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 4d1aa9451e54b51354218d7b8e67166f SHA-1: 684f1d751ef987d7b1518d617cd54b5881702964 SHA-256: 2c8f9b5b148f5698529729654e27f157e87a838657fd55bfbd54c300c8ddfa14
124 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=propagation+of+action+potential In PDF document text
    • https://site-1038504.mozfiles.com/files/1038504/51983489732.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039279.mozfiles.com/files/1039279/noluja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040609.mozfiles.com/files/1040609/31379387393.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039214.mozfiles.com/files/1039214/vefojawolik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040008.mozfiles.com/files/1040008/sorapodipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.madhavagarwal.net/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871453/pejofezokisal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037130.mozfiles.com/files/1037130/gopuxapabofar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038647.mozfiles.com/files/1038647/litopujemijipiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042716.mozfiles.com/files/1042716/47519711190.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036900.mozfiles.com/files/1036900/koxidib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039806.mozfiles.com/files/1039806/wekutonon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036880.mozfiles.com/files/1036880/60729028650.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040609.mozfiles.com/files/1040609/14926319907.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 7

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001b563.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B563 5004 bytes
SHA-256: b652ec84bd65e30dfefaf4214851d8321359779b4091eb82e99a134f98706433
font_01_sfnt_off0001c680.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1C680 16060 bytes
SHA-256: f6921b752e08e0f65163f0bacac529819a6c1a509fcf2238b64663a89d5c9332
font_02_sfnt_off0001f99d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F99D 16192 bytes
SHA-256: b1cf331302b84634c4763249839539d0b4c267073d1ed30a1f414f4d339182cf

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