Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c8cebbc1927e131…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.9 KB Created: 2020-07-14 05:50:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 7bc8a5b8428812fc40cb396d75027e16 SHA-1: edaa3ec4d346b36714bb50017752d46086137f0e SHA-256: 2c8cebbc1927e131b074c2982267c93f47d1f40065d35de120f98dff910a1d21
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, identified as a link farm, designed to redirect users to malicious infrastructure. The primary redirector URL is confirmed malicious. The document body contains garbled text, suggesting it is not intended for direct user consumption but rather as a vehicle for the embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=propiedades%20de%20los%20logaritmos%20naturales%20y%20exponenciales%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.claudiacait.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482828/tesugozisokiwom-revuluweri-kegexibipun-vevenubat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.global-banking.net/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681698/1450607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cloudcatmedia.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872037/3327388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://katazixabat.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/35101707040.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://laderafi767971175.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/20105397702.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sexedituf.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fonigowovasuxoguzavav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lipodixo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/61138732907.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muzinag.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/34996515652.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pixaduxuse.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/78398027964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zigexonidu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/xiduxipulizikexupuzip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://topobid.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/73313341222.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zotiziza.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/morilinazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2280/3366/files/gekodezuximozum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1310/2998/files/zefuluko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/buxigol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/fawalonilon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4365/1735/files/28799890869.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2285/9944/files/pepotejuzuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006dfa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6DFA 5528 bytes
SHA-256: 3b7a20cf4e7bec7171307ecba8a81ab672987e08277b345c56648cf3a1af5ddd
font_01_sfnt_off000080b8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80B8 10732 bytes
SHA-256: e6fcdf90229bbd521175946ddd042486b13454e65e2af48e73c9e409d0cbe38b

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