Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c75bfb4292e3b3d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: f5f1fe4ee94ac02938249ee9cc9c0a44 SHA-1: 1d9045ca278e5b71f20c04cb1c25a7ec320d743a SHA-256: 2c75bfb4292e3b3d773691d4cbff6c0108ef3b0b46046855a18bfd0edad6cbf4
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates exploitation of a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution. No further stages or IOCs were identified in the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a7.bin
e26e261308bf0ada0f59794db17a4265a2493f7cc3250a4a6269530b779ecae2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA7 1489 bytes