Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c6e33efa86c7d63…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-09-03 09:24:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 4817667dc4bb70bcc749fd32624d2204 SHA-1: 2487a52cfd064d90f731bea7aa3d43e226a94922 SHA-256: 2c6e33efa86c7d6332421bd1b44febda5cdaf07f84d8fab3a0364419f7cdb1da
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a link farm pointing to multiple compromised CMS upload directories, a common technique for hosting malicious files. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the presence of numerous unknown URLs supports the conclusion that this document is designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL patterns are indicative of a phishing or malware distribution lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://alhouti.com/userfiles/file/jesegaxavagokavixun.pdf
    • http://globalquestconsulting.com/userfiles/files/80194571599.pdf
    • http://www.morrisjones.co.uk/EditorImages/file/tepurijavizixi.pdf
    • https://ag-concept.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4333c00cd202d5f7b8eab93508d4e6fe/41100072594.pdf
    • http://enjoyisagenix.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/28207347320.pdf
    • https://christianboudreau.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b44100f0ed7---xolavejikesiwozofarom.pdf
    • http://youandisagenix.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zizotufu.pdf
    • https://lodoshosting.com/calisma2/files/uploads/14329990846.pdf
    • http://www.a-fairys-choice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf52b748572---povupivimisikukanumim.pdf
    • http://huucodatlanh.com/userfiles/file/pevosetejorug.pdf
    • http://transcash.com/ci/userfiles/files/33519025164.pdf
    • http://itineraire-consulting.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/witugegevorugogojetelepur.pdf
    • https://cbdc.co/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kusesoxavalokoporikinis.pdf
    • http://altelaw.com/uploads/image/file/77414936692.pdf
    • http://edanieltour.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210703_1CEEDE2C2899A80D.pdf
    • https://agilitynd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/41f721f2acdb09c9cfbad29d72bf872c/totudupavasur.pdf
    • http://ccsilver.kr/files/fckeditor/file/127580177360ff58eb2d0a9.pdf
    • https://genesisbehaviorcenter.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a703eed0d8b5dc77e074acdc23649721/bafuril.pdf
    • http://pvsystexperts.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9np3vs8gn5m4525ua7vi2dsau0/7130100258.pdf
    • https://www.hungarianassociation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5de1057c61---wivemeketoduzelezobineji.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=netgear+d7000+manuale+italiano
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c9b9.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC9B9 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e1cb.bin
da9ac737bad22101c5bc1e9f6eb04316541c2e71f7f757b4e09006f53cb99f39
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE1CB 20428 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001174d.bin
f7ae217c6cca3beb2cba0cbccb1d032e5ae9bd7889407b0a5752608a698e306e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1174D 10672 bytes