Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c585eb6a6b3d165…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.07 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-10
MD5: 63e3bfaaa31cc2014010270ecfbc72be SHA-1: 7d28d8f975934c9b3f341696916e52c6e773c040 SHA-256: 2c585eb6a6b3d165c75312f0676e312fc0b1c9dbfd63ab4a060356669f605c90
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. The presence of an OLE object containing this exploit payload strongly suggests the document is designed to leverage this vulnerability. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and no malicious URLs were extracted, indicating the primary attack vector is the embedded exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
49211c49e92e783a29bd20e4981ba551e3b0a9771c40ab3d7903ea2693f95cc5		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0A8EB6DD/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_03.bin
f81b5dc0f134bff67b32850863689811e3ff1dad6ed5cd918403c20cc4d6ab1e		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0A8EB6E2/Ole10Native 30803 bytes
ole10native_04.bin
ee6730ab3ea7a9b221e09be343a599da2083ec896be188a9cfe3600be42ad4ad		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0A8EB6E5/Ole10NATivE 1754 bytes

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