Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c40701748874161…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.2 KB Created: 2021-08-16 15:45:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 34b622cc37a2c94ebafa5d659f159fed SHA-1: ae0c93a051ba941db8802664a046d777e111cacc SHA-256: 2c407017488741610c9ff2138315ed2c0539b99c77d622d9b9a09efd34a363b0
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories and disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to trick users into downloading malicious files. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the overall structure points to a spearphishing attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9930

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://spy-military-labs.com/userfiles/file/25311891593.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://ehblending.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/01b8e5acc7a06b639aec40831f6b6b3e/koridififasap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hardlineconstruct.ro/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/77087766271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noukos.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b643b9dd91---19803977404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thealloywheelcentre.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b5ee78b65bc3eb886e52a94094eb5eb6/5269019909.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pablohernandes.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/02a49c098a8c4bdecfad3936b986f5b1/xesoxojamiroxik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alexlunacoach.com/img/editor/file/99999318192.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wallawallahighschool1968.org/clients/75819/File/fosawesuxifapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pxmonastery.org/CKEdit/upload/files/tofesej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asbazainville.org/userfiles/file/80489019880.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stadtbild-intervention.de/Quansis/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kudirodokenek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sgcaregiver.org/contents/files/namunikakowekitezotusin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/54413898336.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://scapetime.net/images/website/user/files/meramixofabivom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aelma.com/sites/default/userfiles/file/kagoronafoboburetesuroxop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tuabogadoangel.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/411f7013563473abcdd62c672e30986d/runulasuxewevelawisuboxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pointsourcegroup.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2db9fb0e2c026f152db11f9edab61ac2/89318780104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://halvani.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bcb050771fe---fijek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dansecyr.ca/pdf/file/supukasifekovuludedewogob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cattaneoarchitetti.it/userfiles/files/81267985813.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asja-doll.ru/userfiles/file/59730572283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://technoculture.cz/admin/upload/file/85946516388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mahlkoenig.nl/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/xukafoviresaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fullertherapy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f50a09cfcc---6033153362.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=pre+algebra+with+pizzazz+answer+key+did+you+hear+aboutPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e700.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE700 11264 bytes
SHA-256: 4505f2b3b12d34b02a5f29225cac2cf0d632cb30f19500c9ac7e0e4e22b2411b
font_01_sfnt_off0001010d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1010D 16068 bytes
SHA-256: 98b4b89bdcb6722f075577d1dca8745f7e9f6f6dd71589732adbb0cbee7acf71
font_02_sfnt_off00012a71.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12A71 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_03_sfnt_off00014282.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14282 16252 bytes
SHA-256: bfc7ce51a1a9b37382af61f0075eb0cdb972126da031002d338643432d80e6e4