Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2c1df7b373b0c24a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

53.1 KB Created: 2020-09-01 22:41:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 018e17ce4a70982d8add6c2a03eb0761 SHA-1: 0d60d24049841d08e5337c9d0f887de129852bc4 SHA-256: 2c1df7b373b0c24a3ffd3cf0ced2d8f02c207db6dc8d0350caa4a9ae8ac1fd68
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a link that redirects to a known malicious domain, identified by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the URL that is also present in the heuristics. The PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic indicates a large number of external links, suggesting a link farm for SEO manipulation or to host malicious content. The SE_INVOICE_LURE heuristic suggests the document is designed to appear as an invoice or payment request to trick the user into clicking the malicious link.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/wix?keyword=office+administration+and+management+pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b972d5_88e5e12655e147dea897108340a67aab.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/270e53_fb800a89c0664ee3a437e5e872c4d32b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/61b8bf_7974ad34d21a4b21b4e2735b00c22ef7.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_5862d2c5c5884edd852281edacd75649.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0444/0326/1606/files/cdna_synthesis.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7490/2430/files/dominions_5_ea_pangaea_guide.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/76102764406.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0996/5212/files/lezezuzir.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4886/9786/files/26439951675.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8938/7935/files/volokafofilapubaru.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2892/9947/files/wurafumolumu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/6889/1040/files/jaguloseboraratebux.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/23083433767.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9240/1573/files/wukubazuludi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/7341/4055/files/dibusefado.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008a60.bin
2c9c624aa5a495d9d9e61737f41f286d257fefc14d8c2180347d92d6adb0db97
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8A60 5468 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009ce9.bin
10685ab8d4346baea5d24e7d1ad0a720c3bfce64bbfa7586a9dec74b481766bc
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9CE9 13104 bytes